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ARGUMENT IN REPLY

II.

A.

Introduction

The

was unimportant

state asserts that evidence of motive

to its trial case

because “[t]he only dispute was Whether Cangro saw the activated police
Respondent’s Brief,
t0 conclude

p. 5.

But that

is

a non sequitur because the state asked the jury

Mr. Cangro saw the activated police lights and ﬂed because he had a

motive t0 d0

so.

These were the

first

words out 0f the

statement and the last words uttered in
1n. 10-13);

R 237

(EX.

C

its

state’s

pg. 311, 1n. 2-3). In between,

was compelling evidence that he saw the

current position that motive
B.

is

immaterial

mouth

R

rebuttal argument.
it

is

lights.

in its opening

183 (EX. C pg. 96,

repeatedly argued t0 the jury

the fact that Mr. Cangro had a motive to elude the officer
lights

lights.”

When he

activated his

As shown below, the

state’s

a Charade.

Why ReliefShouId be Granted.
1.

Deficient performance

The

state does not contest the post-conviction court’s conclusion that trial

counsel’s failure t0

under Strickland

V.

impeach Ms. Prindle’s testimony was

deficient performance

Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984); nor does

deficient performance

Mr. Cangro’s defense

went

t0

both the

t0 the eluding

DUI and

it

eluding counts.

contest that the
It

only argues that

count was not affected by the deficient

performance. See Respondent’s Brief,

p.

’7.

This Court should conclude there was

deficient performance as t0 both counts for the reasons previously argued.
Brief, p. 12-13.

Opening

Prejudice

2.

Whether Mr. Cangro was prejudiced by the
question 0f law and

fact.

Booth

Strickland, 466 U.S., at 698.

Court Will defer t0 the

V.

deficient

State, 151 Idaho 612,

“When faced With a mixed

district court’s factual findings if

performance

is

a mixed

617 (2011), citing
question 0f fact and law, the

supported by substantial

evidence, but Will exercise free review over the application of the relevant law to

those facts.”

Id.

Under

this standard, this Court should freely review the post-

conviction court’s application 0f the law t0 the facts

and conclude Mr. Cangro was

prejudiced as t0 the eluding count.

In

motive

its

is

responsive brief, the state spends a great deal 0f time proving that

not an element of the eluding count.

Why it

does so

also notes that fact is undisputed. Respondent’s Brief, p.

that argument

is

is

N0

8.

not clear since
further

it

comment 0n

needed.

Next, the state argues that since “the only dispute” at trial

was Whether Mr.

Cangro’s eluding was done “willfully,” the question of motive was immaterial. Id,
p. 9.

That argument

willfully

wrong. The jury was instructed that, “An act

When it’s done 0n

t0 find that

vehicle.

is

purpose.”

R

227 (EX.

C. pg. 269, 1n. 15-16).

Mr. Cangro willfully ﬂed 0r attempted

R 226

is

t0 elude a

done

The jury had

pursuing police

(EX. C. pg. 267, 1n. 12-14). In order t0 attempt to elude a pursuing

police vehicle “0n purpose,” the defendant

must be aware a

police vehicle is in

pursuit. Thus, the resolution of the “willfully” dispute at trial turned 0n

Mr. Cangro had a reason

t0 elude the police

2

and the

state asserted he

Whether

had such a

reason. It posited that Mr. Cangro acted willfully t0 avoid being arrested for DUI.
It is

only since obtaining the conviction has the state downplayed the importance 0f

motive.

Without the

state’s asserted

motive t0 elude, the

state’s evidence

0n that

count was weak. First, there was n0 documentary evidence that the deputy even
activated his lights, as he failed t0 activate his patrol vehicle’s Video-recorder.
(EX.

is

C

pg. 151, 1n. 3-11).

suspicious

The

officer’s failure t0 follow

all,

the “normal course 0f duties”

especially after hearing Mr. Cangro’s testimony.

Further, While unmentioned by the state in
stated in his police report,

“I

confirmed that report at the
“I

197

and a rational jury could have harbored doubts about Whether the

deputy activated his lights at

that

R

was unsure
trial.

R

he saw

my

emergency

200 (EX. C pg. 162,

assumed that he had seen my

swerving” and “high rate 0f speed.”

if

R

Deputy Hickam

its recitation 0f facts,

lights”

lights.”

1n. 11-24).

He

He

also testified

based upon Mr. Cangro’s “lack 0f

203 (EX.

C. p. 1’75, 1n. 11-14)

(emphasis

added).

Thus, the state’s only Witness t0 the lights being activated forgot t0 turn on
his Video-recording t0 prove he activated them, could not say Mr.

and only assumed Mr. Cangro saw them. In opposition
willfulness,

Mr. Cangro

testified that

C, pg. 221, 1n. 13-14, p. 22, 1n. 12-13).

Cangro

Cangro saw them

t0 the state’s scant proof 0f

he did not see any police

lights.

Given the deputy’s inability

willfully ignored his signals t0 stop

R 215

(Exhibit

t0 testify that

and Mr. Cangro’s testimony

t0 the

contrary, the state’s newly found confidence in the strength 0f its evidence 0f
8

Mr.

willfulness

is

not supported by the trial record. In

willfulness

is

why

only

way it

fact,

the absence 0f evidence 0f

the state emphasized the motive evidence at the

was the

could prove willfulness, an essential element of the offense.

Ms. Prindle’s mistaken testimony that Mr. Cangro
10130, instead 0f 12345

The

trial. It

was

left

the Longhorn Bar at

central t0 the state’s theory 0f intoxication as motive.

prosecutor emphasized that Ms. Prindle, “an uninterested Witness

trial

testified that

Mr. Cangro

pg. 286, 1n. 13-14).

He

left

the Longhorn between 10330 and 11300.”

R 231

.

.

.

(EX.

C

continued:

So we’ve got n0 testimony between about 11300 and 12345. That’s almost two
hours unaccounted for. What could he have done during that two hours[?]
Id. (EX.

C

pg. 286, 1n.

24 — pg. 287,

1n. 4.

The

Cangro had spent that time getting drunk

state’s

answer

at Cowgirls.

downplays the importance 0f that evidence,

it

t0 its question

was Mr.

While the state now

emphasized

it

in closing argument!

That 11019 1'11 the timeljne 1's important. Moving it matters because What the
Witnesses testified is that nobody saw him — nobody Who testified saw him
that night after about 11300 o’clock. That leaves over an hour, an hour and 45
minutes before he was pulled over.

R

237 (EX. C pg. 309,

And

1n. 3'8)

(emphasis added).

absent the inference that Mr. Cangro had spent the two hours drinking

at Cowgirls, the state evidence 0f the

DUI

motive was weak. The state had t0

charge Mr. Cangro With the driving “While under the inﬂuence,”

R 28,

rather than

the “per se” alternative because there were n0 blood or breath tests administered.

There were also n0

was Ms.

Prindle’s

field sobriety tests

administered. The only evidence 0f drinking

and Mr. Cangro’s testimony that he drank one'half 0f a
4

beer.

R

210-213 (EX. C, pg. 203,
testified that

Mr. Cangro appeared

he drank did not
1n. 1; pg.

alcohol

1n. 9-17; pg.

affect or

t0

21 — pg. 217,

1n.

1n. 2.).

Ms. Prindle

be sober and Mr. Cangro testified that what

impair his driving

220, 1n. 12-19. Likewise,

When they were

216,

abilities.

Ray Berryman

together that evening.

R

TT pg. 203

25 — pg. 204,

1n.

did not see Mr. Cangro drink any

210 (EX. C pg. 209,

1n. 13-18).

Mr. Cangro’s driving pattern was not strong evidence 0f intoxication. In
the prosecutor elicited testimony that Mr. Cangro

C

pg. 248, 1n. 10-13. (Q.

night; right,

skillfully.

R 221

(EX.

that you were driving pretty skillfully that

around barricades and 0n bank canal? A. Yeah”) The prosecutor also

emphasized the
1n.

You agree

was driving

fact,

skillful driving

during his closing argument.

15 [“skillfully avoiding police officer,”

coherently and he was driving
bike.”]). Skillful driving is

1n.

skillfully”], 1n.

25

(EX.

C

pg. 292,

was answering

[“Skillfully eluding

0n the road

not impaired driving.

Finally, as t0 Mr. Cangro’s refusal t0

inference of guilt.

19-21 [“And he

R 232

And it is

a

weak

submit

t0 testing, that only raises

inference because a rational jury

an

armed With the

testimony that Mr. Cangro did not have the opportunity t0 drink in the time

between leaving the Longhorn and being spotted by Deputy Hickam, would
understand why Mr. Cangro was upset and confused about being asked
testing. It

would have seen that as an error in judgment, as Mr. Cangro

forthrightly admitted at trial,

and not as evidence

of guilt.

t0

submit

t0

Considering the above, the post-conviction court found the failure 0f defense
counsel t0 impeach Ms. Prindle was prejudicial under Strickland as t0 the

DUI

count. It found:

Given that the impeachment evidence at issue goes directly t0 Petitioner’s
whereabouts during that timeframe, the Court finds a reasonable probability
that the outcome would have been different had the jury been able to more
fully weigh Ms. Prindle’s credibility and the conﬂicting testimony provided by
Petitioner. Thus, With respect t0 the misdemeanor DUI Charge, the Court
grants Petitioner’s motion for summary disposition and denies the State’s
motion for summary disposition.

R

335. Since Ms. Prindle’s testimony

that

it

was

was

central t0 the

DUI

also central t0 the establishment 0f the state’s

conviction,

DUI

it

follows

motive in the eluding

charge. Notably, the state did not cross-appeal that ruling, nor does

it

challenge

that finding 0n appeal.

Where Mr. Cangro was coming from was
because

if

he were coming from Cowgirls

(01‘

relevant to the eluding count

any bar other than the Longhorn) he

could have been drinking there. If that were the case,

it

would support the

state’s

theory that Mr. Cangro must have seen the police lights because his subsequent
actions could be explained by his motive to avoid a

DUI

arrest. Otherwise,

not prove Mr. Cangro acted “0n purpose” t0 evade the police.

Longhorn was relevant

and

it is

for the

same reason. The

What time he

state’s trial counsel

it

could

left

the

thought so

disingenuous for the state t0 deny that now.
II.

The

CONCLUSION

post'conviction court’s conclusion that evidence 0f motive

t0 the eluding

charge

is illogical,

contrary t0 law and
6

human

was immaterial

experience,

and

unsupported by the record. The

and

is

also contradicted

by

its

state’s

argument

argument

in support 0f

it is all

the above

at trial. Consequently, the order granting

the state’s motion t0 summarily dismiss the petition as t0 the eluding charge and
the order denying Mr. Cangro’s motion for

summary

disposition in his favor 0n that

charge should both be reversed. The matter should be remanded for the entry 0f a

judgment

in favor 0f Mr.

Cangro 0n the eluding count.

Respectfully submitted this 8th day of January 2021.

/s/ Dennis Benjamin
Dennis Benjamin

Attorney for Christopher Cangro
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